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Multiculturalism in a comparative citizenship frame 
The paper looks at the tension between gender equality and recognition of 
diversity/multiculturalism from a comparative Scandinavian and European 
context using citizenship as a frame to illuminate the tension between 
equality and diversity.  
 
Multiculturalism is a contested and the debate about multiculturalism 
includes competing visions, strategies and policies of equality and 
diversity. One side gives priority to respect for diversity, while the other 
side prioritizes gender equality. Multiculturalism has been accused of 
being gender-blind, and in a provocative essay Susan Moller Okin (1999) 
has argued that multiculturalism is against women’s rights. The paper is 
critical of the claim that multiculturalism is bad for women arguing that 





How do welfare, gender and migration regimes interact 
The paper looks at the relation between gender equality and cultural 
equality from a comparative perspective focusing on tensions and conflicts 
in the Nordic countries that are contrasted with France and Germany. The 
point of departure is Denmark, Sweden and Norway and France and 
Germany, and in some cases the UK, is selected because they are supposed 
to represent different welfare, gender and migration regimes. The paper 
starts with a brief summary of the main trends in the evolution of 
migration policies in Europe followed by an overview of key elements in 
integration strategies and philosophies in selected countries. Then it looks 
at the prevailing philosophies of gender equity and in the ways they are 
reflected in policy making. The focus is on two contested issues: The 
debates about family unification and the veil. Both questions need to be 
explored in greater detail by qualitative comparative research. The 
objective is to raise new research questions about the construction of the 
gendered conflicts around migration in different welfare, gender and 
migration regimes.  
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The citizenship frame 
A post-national notion of citizenship can be used to analyse the external 
and internal aspect of migration. It emphasises the interplay between 
migration, i.e. legal access to enter the country, and integration policies, 
including the rights and obligations of individuals living legally in the 
country and the prevailing philosophies of integration. One aspect is the 
relation between and norms, values and identities of citizens and non-
citizens and the interplay between local/regional national and trans-
national aspects of belonging. This paper employs the citizenship frame 
with a focus on ‘lived citizenship’ as a way to explore political-cultural 
‘conflicts’ around gender equality and diversity/multiculturalism. This 
concept emphasises the relations between majority and minority norms, 
discourses and practices as well as the importance of the formation of 
individual, collective and national identities.  
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Dilemmas in European migration policies  
 
Migration policies regulate access to become citizens in legal terms 
through the Aliens Act or Act on Nationality. During he 1990s most 
European countries have developed more restrictive migration policies as a 
result of high unemployment and welfare restructuring, but at the same 
time integration policies have been intensified. It has been noted that there 
is a dilemma between requirements of the human rights regime to open up 
the EC for refugees and EC realpolitik that requires that we keep unwanted 
migrant out of the EC for economic reasons (fortress Europe). This has 
created a link between nationality legislation regulating entrance to the 
territory and ‘integration’ legislation. 
 
The European perspective is expressed in EU Directives and guidelines on 
asylum and migration. Asylum refers specifically to the rules in the 
European Convention of Human Rights, ECHR (and to CEDAW), 
whereas migration refers to the rules for integration of workers to the EU 
as well as between the EC countries. The two have become intertwined 
since the general stop for ‘guest workers’ in most European countries. 
Today only specific categories of workers are allowed on a ‘green card’ 
and all other migrants come as refugees or through family unification. This 
may change in the future because there is a growing need for workers in 
different EU countries related to the aging population. 
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European guidelines and discourses  
Migration and integration policies are highly contested, and EU has not 
adopted a common policy, but there are important attempts to harmonize 
migration policies. The Amsterdam Treaty sought to enhance and 
accelerate the harmonisation of EU asylum and migration policy created 
under Mastricht. Asylum matters have become part of Community Law, 
which means that it is possible to develop binding Community legislation 
in this area. Member states will be responsible for the implementation 
through national legislation that must fit with the European immigration 
and asylum policy and be based on the 1951 Geneva Convention and 1967 
New York Protocol concerning refugees The Amsterdam Treaty set the 
general structure for action towards a common EU asylum policy, but the 
spirit and objectives that these measures should follow were expressed at 
the European Council Meeting on the 15 and 16 October in Tampere 
Finland.  
The main text from the Tampere meeting discussing “A Common 
EU Asylum and Migration Policy” did not address gender issues. There is, 
however, a growing recognition of gender-specific EU guidelines on 
minimum standards for the qualifications and status as refugees or persons 
in need of protection. European debates concerning gender-specific issues 
related to asylum and migration address mainly two areas: a) gender-




The first issue was addressed by the Commission proposal for a Council 
Directive in 2001 that reads: “In particular, where applicants for 
international protection is a women, account shall be taken of the fact that 
persecution, within the meaning of the Geneva Convention, may be 
effected through sexual violence or other gender-specific means…. Sexual 
violence to refugee women, such as Female Genital Mutilation can also be 
inflicted for the one only reason of gender. In such a situations, the 
persecution ground “membership of a particular social group” could apply 
(Section 2 of Commission proposal for a Council Directive, Brussels, 
12.9.2001). 
 
The second issue is family re-unification, which has been stated in a 
council directive from 2003. The preamble reads: “Family reunification is 
a necessary way of making family life possible. It helps to create socio-
cultural stability facilitating the integration of third country nationals in 
the member states, which also serves to promote economic and social 
cohesion, a fundamental Community objective stated in the Treaty”. The 
text states that “in order to ensure better integration and to prevent forced 
marriage Member states may require the sponsor and his/her spouse to be 
of a minimum age, and a maximum 21 years, before the spouse is able to 
join him/her”. The “24 year provision” in the Danish Alien Act (from 
2002) that requires that both spouses must be 24 years before they can get 
a residence permit to marry a non-citizen is therefore only possible 
because of the Danish reservation regarding legal and interior matters.  
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Trends in migration policies – the French and German case
  
During the 1990s the European migration regimes have moved closer 
together, and it has been noted that each in different ways combine the two 
principles: jus sanguineous and jus soli. Some countries, which belong to 
different migration regimes, have like Germany and France moved in 
different directions. Germany has moved from the ethno-cultural pole  - 
jus sanguineous - towards the territorial pole - jus soli – (in 2000), whereas 
France has moved from the territorial towards the ethno-cultural pole (in 
1993). For example only children of German nationals could previously 
acquire German nationality by birth. This has changed and now children 
born in Germany may also be granted German nationality by birth if the 
parents have lived in Germany for more than eight years. There is also a 
legal claim to naturalisation for all who have stayed more than eight years 
if further requirements are fulfilled. The French case has moved in the 
different direction. Previously a child born in France to parents of foreign 
nationality automatically acquired French citizenship at the age of 18 if the 
child had residence in France. This has changed and since 1993 individuals 
have actively to declare that they want to acquire French nationality.  
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Multicultural citizenship regimes 
 
Britain and the Netherlands are supposed to belong to plural or 
multicultural citizenship regimes. Here the political panic about the 
dependency of migrants of social welfare without work in many countries 
has been followed by a trend towards more restrictive migration policies. 
The British and Dutch migration regimes are still fairly liberal with only 5 
years resident requirements and with the possibility to enjoy dual 
citizenship in Britain. The Dutch Nationality Act dates back to 1985 with 
only minor amendments, the most important being the amendment of 
2003. The general trend is that it has become a bit more difficult to gain 
nationality, for example pass a nationalisation test, and there are new 
requirements for keeping Dutch nationality if one is abroad.  
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Scandinavian citizenship regimes? 
The Scandinavian countries belong to the same world of welfare and 
gender regimes and have been regarded as liberal and tolerant towards 
immigrants and refugees, but recent research has documented that this has 
not been the practice. They have had rather pragmatic attitudes towards 
migration of foreigners, and it is only since the 1970 that they have 
experienced large immigration mainly from the Middle East. Sweden is 
the most liberal Nordic migration country and has been a pioneer in terms 
of integration. Today 15 percent of the population are immigrants, whereas 
the percentage in Norway and Denmark is 7 and 6 percent respectively. 
Scandinavia has a common historical heritage and in all three countries 
there is today a social nationalism closely linked to the creation of the 
welfare state. In terms of migration there is no Nordic model. Norway is a 
relatively new nation, with a strong ‘official’ nationalism. According to a 
recent study the political histories in the two old nations, Sweden vs. 
Denmark, have created two forms of nationalisms that have been described 
as ‘official’ nationalism ‘from above’ dominated by elites vs. ‘informal’ 
nationalism ‘from below’. Arguably the strong emphasis on the dual 
breadwinner model and a thick notion of gender equality has today 
become part of Nordic nationalism. This can explain the tensions between 
gender equality and respect for cultural diversity, which creates gender 
‘conflicts’ around patriarchal family forms. The prevalent philosophies 
have both potentials for equal treatment of young minority women as well 
as barriers for respecting the family culture and values of ethnic minorities. 
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Requirements for naturalization 
One of the most important requirements for naturalization in Europe is 
requirement of residence. At one pole there are relatively strict 
requirements of residence: 12 years in Spain (since 2002?), nine years in 
Denmark (a change from seven years in 2002), eight years in Germany (a 
change from 15 years in 2000) and Finland, and seven years in Norway. At 
the other pole there are relatively liberal residence requirements, only five 
years in Britain (since 2002?), the Netherlands and Sweden (since 2001), 
less if you are stateless or refugee. Denmark has moved from a relatively 
liberal towards a restrictive immigration regime between 1983 and 2002, 
whereas Sweden has accepted double citizenship for the first time with the 
Swedish act on nationality from 2001.  
The European guidelines emphasise the right to family-unification, 
and most countries have more liberal requirements for spouses. Most 
countries also have some kind of language requirements but the tendency 
is to become more restrictive and demand language or even nationality 
tests. According to the Dutch nationality Act of 2003 you must be able to 
show that you are sufficiently integrated in Dutch society and is able to 
speak, read, write and understand the Dutch language reasonably well. By 
passing a naturalisation test before you submit an application for 
naturalisation. Finland has adopted a language test, and in Denmark you 
have to document a minimum skill in Danish language and knowledge of 
history, culture and society. 
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Key elements in integration policies  
During the 1990ies the link between nationality legislation regulating 
‘entrance’ to the territory and ‘integration’ legislation has become more 
visible. The objective of integration is to transform foreigners to ‘citizens’ 
through national policies of ‘integration. They are based upon normative 
assumptions ranging from philosophies of assimilation at the one end and 
pluralist integration at the other. Integration policies, norms and discourses 
specify the rights and obligations of a good citizen and construct the 
boundaries between ‘them and us’ between ‘citizens’ and ‘non-citizens’. 
Legislation is janus-faced and may often have a double effect of including 
and disciplining citizens, for example the demand to learn the language. 
The following section gives a brief overview of the main tendencies and 
national variations in integration policies in selected policy areas. The 
focus is on differences in philosophies of integration in France, Germany, 
Denmark and Sweden. 
Integration is controversial and what is perceived as good integration 
is contextual.  Integration is a broad and fuzzy term that concerns different 
policy areas that may include social, political, cultural and civil rights as 
well as anti-discrimination legislation. Many welfare states have adopted 
policies to promote ‘integration’ to improve migrants’ opportunities to 
realize theirs rights, going beyond formal rights by encouraging 
participation and a sense of belonging; for example through labour market 
schemes, social care and general welfare, education, language training, and 
support for NGOs etc.  
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Integration policies in Scandinavia 
Sweden, Norway and Denmark have all developed pro-active integration 
policies during the 1990s, and political efforts to integrate immigrants and 
refugees on the labour market and in political and cultural life have been 
strengthened. In spite of this there is a growing acknowledgment that 
integration has failed. One of the main indicators is the high 
unemployment rate for newcomers compared to majority population.  
Sweden was the pioneer and has adopted new policies towards and  
’Storstadsstatsningen’ (from 1997) directed towards breaking social 
segregation in local communities marks a shift away from specific 
programmes directed towards minorities towards general welfare 
programmes.. 
The first Danish Integration Law from 1999 is an example of 
proactive policies and illustrates the ambiguities in the term ‘integration’. 
The objective of the Law is stated as ‘equality’ in the sense that integration 
aims: 1) to give newly arrived foreigners the possibility to participate 
equally with other citizens in political, economic, work, social, religious 
and cultural life, 2) to contribute to economic self-sufficiency, and 3) to 
give the individual understanding of Danish cultural values and norms. In 
the official view the Law is a step towards equal citizenship for minorities, 
but it has also be interpreted as an attempt to assimilate minorities to 
Danish values and the Danish way of life. There is no evaluation of the 
general effects of the law, and critics have pointed out that the different 
principles make it open to contrasting regulations and implementations.  
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Scandinavian welfare states are based upon universal social rights to 
all citizens, and immigrants and refugees normally have the same rights as 
native citizens. One exception to this general rule is the introductory 
benefit called the ‘start help’, adopted in Denmark in 2002. Non-citizens 
only gain the right to full and equal social benefits after 7 year in 
Denmark. The ‘starthelp’- called the ‘introduction grant’ - is highly 
contested, and there has been a considerable critique of this attack on the 
social rights of refugees. It is criticised both as a form of discrimination 
that reduces their economic resources, as an attack of universalism and as 
a breach against the equal treatment principle in the human rights 
conventions. The official claim is, based upon economic expertise, that the 
grant is a positive incentive to integrate refugees on the labour market, but 
critiques have documented that it is a barrier to social integration of 
refugees that increases their poverty. 
In Scandinavia as well as in most European countries integration on 
the labour market is perceived to be the key to other forms of integration 
but there are variations in requirements for activation of workers, 
including requirements for minority mothers/single mothers to do wage 
work, in rights/obligations for minority children to learn the language 
before they start school and attend kindergardens or day care centres. The 
integration issues are related to normative questions about what is a good 
citizen, a good mother or a good worker etc. The demand that minorities 
should be expected to learn the native language and pass language tests 
can be seen both as a positive and negative factor for integration. 
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One important welfare area is social rights. In most European 
countries there has been a general trend toward cuts in social provisions 
and benefits and a tightening of control and supervision. 
Another crucial area is democratic politics. To what extent do 
minorities have ‘a voice and a vote’ through representation in local and 
national elections, participation in voluntary associations and a voice in 
public debates. Voting rights are contested and there is often a gap 
between formal rights and the will and capability of different migrant 
groups to use these rights. Ireland was the first European country that gave 
foreigners voting rights in local elections in 1963, followed by Sweden in 
1976 and Denmark in 1981, Norway in 1982 and the Netherlands in 1985. 
In many countries it is still only EU-citizens that can vote in local 
elections.  
Cultural rights are perceived to be a crucial arena for integration. 
They are ambiguous because they refer both to the right to be treated as 
equals and to special group rights that respect cultural diversity, for 
example the right to practice your own language, religion, dress and 
behaviour. Cultural rights often concern the daily lives of minority women. 
One illustration is the debate about women’s use of the scarf. It is 
interpreted by the prevailing philosophies either as the civil right to wear a 
head-scarf as workers, teachers or pupils or as the state’s right to keep 
religious symbols out of the public arena. It is an illustrative example of a 
gender-a specific integration issue that have different framings in countries 
like France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, Denmark and Norway.  
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European countries also have different traditions in relation to anti-
discrimination legislation. Some countries, like Britain, have strong 
traditions for anti-discrimination legislation, while other countries, like the 
Nordic countries, have no tradition for anti-discrimination legislation. The 
UN Race discrimination Convention from 1965 and the European Human 
Rights Convention from 1965 have strengthened the awareness of 
discrimination in Europe, and the legislation has gradually been 
implemented in most European countries. Again more comparative 
research is needed about the implementation of antidiscrimination 
legislation cross-nationally. 
 
One example is Denmark. Here ethnic discrimination has been against the 
law since 1971, but it was not till 1996 that a new law against Ethnic 
Discrimination was adopted in relation to the Labour market. The Board 
for Ethnic Equality was established in 1993 but dissolved again in 2002 
and the tasks were moved to the Institute for Human Rights. There is a 
growing international criticism of Danish discrimination and intolerance, 
for example from the European Commission against Racism and 
Intolerance (ECRI) and the United Nations Committee against Race 
Discrimination (CERD), and UN’s Women’s Committee (CEDAW). The 
government has rejected or ignored the international critique, but there is a 
growing public debate about whether Denmark does indeed confirm to 
international Conventions and obligations.  
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To sum up: Main tendencies in migration policies 
Have we moved towards pluralist integration or assimilation of foreigners, 
and what are the implications of the different integration policies for 
gender relations? One trend is the general tendency to restrict access to the 
territory that is expressed in the move from a liberal to more restrictive 
policies towards immigrants and refugee and in most countries during the 
1990s. The best examples would be Denmark and France. The best 
examples of a move to a more liberal regime are Sweden that has accepted 
double citizenship, and Germany where requirements for residence have 
been shortened considerably.  
 
The second major trend is the tendency to restrict immigration and 
intensify ‘integration’. The Danish case is an illustration of both 
tendencies, since the move from a liberal to a restrictive regime during the 
last 20 years has been accompanied by ambitious and comprehensive 
integration legislation in 1999.  
 
The gender aspect of European asylum and migration legislation refers to 
two issues: 1) gender-specific persecution as grounds for recognizing a 
refugee status according to the Geneva Refugee Convention and 2) the 
right to family-unification. Most countries have adopted policies about the 
right to family-unification according to EC Directive 2003/86 with the 
exception of Denmark who is able to maintain legislation of family 
reunification that is stricter than other member states are allowed to have.  
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How are the debates gendered? 
The objective of this section is to illustrate how the two selected cases are 
framed by different policies, discourses and perceptions of the public and 
private arena across Europe shaped by national histories, political 
institutions and belongings. The first case is the debate about forced and 
arranged marriages that are contested issue in countries like Denmark, 
Norway and Britain. The other case is the debate about the headscarf that 
has become a hot issue in France, Germany and the Netherlands. What is 
the framing and arguments of the dominant discourse and who are the 
main actors? And why has it become an important issue? How are the 
political issues shaped by national and international debates and political 
contexts and philosophies? These are research questions, and more 
qualitative comparative research is needed in order to answer them. 
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The debate about family- unification  
It has been noted that family-unification is one of the most obvious 
examples of the problems for authorities navigating between realpolitik 
and humanitarian principles. There is a universal need to be able to live 
with one’s family that is also protested by international conventions. At the 
same time family-unification has become one of the most important 
migration gates to Western Europe. Family-unification has therefore 
become politicised and there is now a EU Directive on Family Unification 
from Third country nationals (Council Directive 2003/86/EC). In many 
countries family unification has also become a hot/contested issue in 
integration policies that is employed to construct a border between ‘them’ 
and ‘us’. Denmark is as mentioned earlier a special case because of the 
Danish adoption of four reservations to the Mastricht Treaty– the EURO, 
the European army, EU citizenship and legal and interior matters – which 
allows it to have stricter rules concerning family-unification than other 
member-states are allowed to have according to EU Directive 2003/86 on 
family-unification. The “24 year provision” in the Danish Alien Act § 9 
(from 2002) that requires that both spouses must be 24 years before they 
can get a residence permit is exceptional and has been widely criticised, 
but there have been similar proposals and debates in Norway. 
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Dominant discourses  
The Scandinavian countries have expressed a common concern about 
gender equality, women’s rights and oppression of girls in patriarchal 
families, but there are remarkable differences in the policies and discourse 
about family unification. Denmark has turned to strict immigration laws 
and action plans while Norway has adopted an Action Plan against forced 
marriages and Sweden has adopted an Action Plan against oppression of 
girls in patriarchal families.  
In Denmark the present amendment of the Aliens Act law from 2002 
was adopted by the Liberal-Conservative Government with support of 
Danish People’s Party. The primary aim is to limit the number of 
immigrants. Secondary goals include the prevention of forced marriages 
and to ensure “the best possible base for a successful integration”. The 
Government “Action Plan for 2003-2005 on Forced, Quasi-forced and 
Arranged Marriages” illustrates that the official discourse aims not only to 
prevent marriages that involve force, which is against the law, but also to 
prevent all forms of arranged marriages, including between cousins. The 
main conflict is between the majority norms about gender equality in 
‘normal’ families and the tradition of forced and arranged marriages that is 
said to express a lack of self-determination for minority women. Both 
forced and arranged marriages thus have the same negative effects in 
relation to lack of self-determination and integration. The emphasis is put 
on restrictive policies and negative discourses and not on preventive 
measures and dialogue.  
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The centre of Danish, and according to Anja Bredal increasingly also 
Norwegian policies, is a strong discourse that presents marriage as a 
strategy for immigration, which is different from the more liberal British 
approach. The issue of family unification has in both countries been used 
to legitimise stricter immigration legislation, including policies that are 
questionable from a human rights perspective. There is a real dilemma 
between the fight against forced marriages and strengthening women’s 
position in minority groups and the need to avoid racial discrimination and 
human rights violations. In the Scandinavian countries political parties 
have used the discourse of women’s rights for racist and discriminatory 
purposes and in Norway and Denmark there seems to be a need for less 
restrictive policy regulations of family reunification on a general level. 
This should not be read as an argument for accepting a form for 
multiculturalism that resists state intervention in “private matters” such as 
violence against women and fight to preserve patriarchal practices and 
“traditions”. The alternative to restrictive policy regulation could be 
proactive policies, and preventive initiatives based on dialogue and 
research sensitive to lived citizenship/lived culture, for example how 
different groups of young migrants interpret their situation.  
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The debate about the head-scarf  
The EU has no explicit regulation of religious issues, but anti-
discrimination directives prohibit discrimination on grounds of religion in 
Member States. There has been an intense debate about wearing 
headscarves in some European countries but the framing of the issue has 
been different. In other European countries, for example in the UK, it has 
not been pressing topics of public debates. It is a women’s issue because it 
concerns women but the topic is often presented as a gender-neutral issue 
concerning religion and culture. In France there is a ban of headscarves 
for pupils to public schools because religious symbols are interpreted as 
being against the republican principle about separation of the state and the 
church and as a threat to ‘laicité’. In Germany six provinces have a ban of 
headscarves of teachers in public schools but private business may not 
prohibit headscarves at work. In the Netherlands there is no general ban of 
veil; headscarf for court personnel is forbidden and dress code for students 
prohibits burqa and niqab. In Denmark there is a debate about the 
employer’s right to set up a general dress code contra and the ban against 
employees wearing a headscarf has been interpreted as an indirect form of 
labour-market discrimination. In Britain the wearing of headscarf is not 
legally regulated, schools are allowed to set up their own dress codes and 
government guidelines allow wearing a veil for a passport photo. In the 
following we look at the different framing of the issue in more detail in 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark. 
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Prevalent philosophies, discourses and policies 
In France a heated debate about religious symbols in the republican 
schools resulted in the adoption of a Law from 2004 that forbids the 
wearing of “ostentatious” religious signs. The debate about the foulard is 
situated in the interpretation of universalism and diversity in the French 
context and what is at stake is the construction of national unity and 
republican identity. The prevalent republican philosophy is different from 
both the liberal vision centered on individual rights or a liberal version of 
integration, where the state accepts specific group rights, as well as from 
the Scandinavian emphasis on universal welfare rights.  
One main question for me is, what may explain the changed attitudes on 
the Left and among feminists? In the French political context the issue was 
first exploited by the extreme Right (in 1989), then by the Rightwing 
government (in 1994) and finally it was supported by both Left and Right 
(in 2004). The arguments were the national fight against insecurity and the 
international fight against terrorism. The debate has become international 
with Fukiyama pro and Giddens against it. French feminism is divided. 
Two influential feminists have adopted radically different positions. Anne 
Zelinski, close to Simone de Beauvoir’s egalitarian position, has signed a 
petition in le Monde in support of the law and she even wants to ban the 
foulard on the streets. Another egalitarian feminist, Christine Delphy, is 
critical of the law, because it may contribute to exclude Muslim girls from 
the public schools. Both positions aim to liberate Muslim girls and argue 
on their behalf. 
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How have feminist researchers interpreted the debate? Francois 
Gaspard emphasises that the meaning of the foulard is situated and 
contextual. It can be both a sign of oppression and a demand from young 
girls, who often chose to wear the foulard against the wishes of their 
families, for recognition of their identity. In the latter case the foulard can 
be interpreted as an instrument of autonomy that protects them from male 
violence in the public space. In Turkey where the foulard is banned not 
only in schools but also at the universities and in Parliament wearing the 
foulard has become a political statement for Muslim women. Gaspard 
finds that women have become prisoners of national and international 
politics, and she seems to support both respect for religious diversity of 
minorities, including women’s right to autonomy as universal principles.  
 
The question is how to solve the conflicts between the two:  
• Kymlicka’s position validating respect for diversity ‘that all cultures 
should be treated as morally equal’ 
• Okin’s position validating gender equality ‘that all cultures should 
effectively treat each other as moral equals’? 
 
My point is that it is not a universal conflict but must be solved by 
listening to the arguments of the parties in different context.
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Sawitri Saharso has analysed the different framing of the debate in 
Germany and the Netherlands. Interesting to me is both the difference in 
the two cases but also the discursive splits in society and the shifts in 
legislation and public opinion. The Courts saw the conflict as being 
basically between positive and negative religious freedom and the lower 
Courts ruled in favour of the latter. The Federal Constitutional Court, 
however, came with a double judgement: 
 
• A ban for teachers to wear a headscarf in school is against public law 
of Baden-Würtenberg. 
• The change of society and the growing religious plurality can be a 
cause for the legislator to redefine religious relations in the school  
 
The judgement was followed by a political split between a ban in federal 
states dominated by the Christian Democratic Party and individual 
examinations of teachers in federal states with the Social Democratic Party 
in power. Sawitri Saharso concludes that the German public thought on the 
headscarf is divided and so is the policy reaction to the headscarf. The 
debate is, as in the Netherlands, about the meaning of the neutrality of the 
schools. 
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The Netherlands is thought to represent a multicultural model, and the 
issue of the headscarf seems less contested than in France but more 
contested than in Britain. According to Saharso this is related to the Dutch 
system of pillarization where state neutrality does not imply banning of 
religion from the public sphere, but rather the guarantee that each creed 
has a right to self-representation and self-organization. She notes that the 
Islamic headscarf is very much accepted in public life in the Netherlands 
and headscarves are only controversial when carried by public officials 
such as policewomen, lawyers and judges. On the other hand, it was 
agreed that Muslim girls who want to wear the hidjab at school, could be 
refused admission. The reasons for that refusal, however, were not 
religious. My question would be whether there are important changes on 
the way in the Dutch multicultural model and what role gender relations 
play in these changes? 
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In Denmark there is no ban for girls to wear headscarves in public 
schools. The political debate about the headscarf has been framed as a 
debate about indirect discrimination at the labour market and it is a conflict 
between employers right to decide vs. trade unions support of anti-
discrimination on religious grounds. The first case was raised in 1998 by a 
young Muslim girl who wanted to do an internship in a big department 
store as part of her school education. The employer sent her home, because 
she would not take off her scarf that she claimed she wore for religious 
reasons. The High Court argued that even though she was under education 
she was still protected by the new anti-discrimination law and could not be 
dismissed solely on the ground that she wore a scarf – for religious 
reasons. The ban on scarves was interpreted as an indirect discrimination 
towards a specific religious group and the employer was fined 10.000 
DDK.  
 
In the second case the employers won. A young girl employed for five 
years decided to wear a headscarf - against the dress code of the 
supermarket and was eventually fired. Her trade union argued that she was 
the victim of indirect discrimination. The employer argued that she did not 
live up to the general dress code for employees to be ‘professionally and 
nicely dressed’. In 2003 the High Court found that the dismissal was legal 
because the supermarket had a uniform and the ban on the headscarves 
was a general ban on all forms of political, religious and cultural symbols. 
A Supreme Court Decision confirmed this in January 2005.  
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Human Rights lawyers were surprised that the Court accepted subjective 
and not objective arguments as safety and health as reasons to ban 
religious headscarves. The argument that employees must appear 
‘identical’ can be discriminating not only for religious minorities but also 
for minorities with a different skin colour as well as for handicaps. The 
implication is that private companies have the right to decide whether it is 
against their ‘dress-code’ to wear headscarves. Some companies have quite 
advanced multicultural policies concerning the scarf, while others, for 
example the Danish cooperation of retail stores, Dansk Supermarked A/S, 
still has a ban on scarves in their shops.  
 
The issue of the headscarf raises questions about the different political 
contexts, discourses & about the role of women’s agency:  
 
1. What are the arguments in the political opportunity structure?  
2. How has the political opportunity structure changed?  
3. How are minority women represented in the dominant discourse, and  
4. How do they present themselves? 
5. What are their motives and identities  
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To sum up: The debates about family-unification and the headscarf both 
tell stories about representation, discrimination and self-presentation of 
minority women and about the different motives for their decision to 
marry or wear a veil that is shaped by national and local contexts. They 
illuminate the conflict between patriarchal oppression in traditional 
cultures and the dominant discourses and norms about equality. Studies 
illustrate that lived culture is dynamic and minority women are able to 
negotiate between the majority norms and their own family culture – 
between their private and public lives. Minority women often feel that they 
belong to different nationalities, or social and cultural groups. 
• The gender perspective points towards the specific democratic 
challenge to create conditions for the voices of ethnic minority 
women to be heard in minority organisations and on the public arena.  
• The multicultural challenge points towards the need to combine the 
vision of equality with principles that respect diversity of religion, 
culture and values, including different family cultures and equality 
norms.  
• Finally the gender-political challenge emphasises the need to create 
constructive dialogues between different feminist visions and gender 
equality norms. Policy makers/ researchers need more knowledge 
and should be more sensitive to how individuals in their daily lives 
experience the diversity of family traditions and norms regarding 




The paper has focused on the linkages between migration and integration 
and between political institutions and the political-cultural through the 
gendered policy debates. The comparative approach is used to illustrate 
how the framing of the same issues is shaped by different political 
histories, institutions and philosophies. France and Germany are thought to 
represent different migration regimes and belong to different welfare 
regimes and gender models. They have both recently decided to ban the 
headscarves although political institutions; national identities and gender 
ideologies have influenced the different framings of the issue. This case 
raise critical questions about the interplay between national and 
international politics and indicate that there are both continuity and shifts 
in the prevailing national philosophies, discourses and policies about 
public regulation of minority religious practices.  
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Britain and The Netherlands are both post-colonial countries that belong to 
the same liberal migration regime but to different welfare and gender 
models. They can contribute to illustrate the gendered tension between 
multiculturalism and assimilation from the pluralist pole. Both countries 
subscribe to philosophies that tend to accept a public-private divide but the 
histories, institutions and discourses are different. The question is whether 
there we will see a shift in the prevailing multicultural philosophies 
because of changes in national and international politics?  
 
The Scandinavian countries belong to the same model of welfare and 
gender but have adopted different migration strategies. They can 
contribute to illuminate the special tension between multiculturalism and 
gender equality. The universal welfare state is closer to the redistributive 
than the recognition dimension. It is not morally neutral and immigrants 
must often abandon cultural beliefs and practices that violate the norms of 
Scandinavian solidarity, including gender equality. The prevailing national 
philosophy today includes a discourse about gender equality that has 
arguably been a barrier for recognition of cultural diversity. The welfare 
regime is based upon a public-private mix and gender equality is perceived 
as a national political ideal, and the question is how to create a dialogue 
between the prevailing discourse of gender equality and respect for 
religious and diversity of family forms and gender equality norms?  
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